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INTRODUCTION
Courts continue to struggle with the limits of statistical sampling in
resolving claims arising from “the mass repetitive wrong.” 1 In Cimino v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., a 1990 asbestos class action, U.S. District Court
Judge Robert Parker divided a class of 2,298 claimants into five
† Harvard University. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author, and not
those of any organization with which he is affiliated. The author thanks John Kenneth Felter for
his helpful comments and edits.
1 Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (citing HERBERT
B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 17.06, at 373 (2d ed. 1985)).
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subclasses based on claimed injuries, and selected a random sample
from each subclass to form a representative sample group of 160
claimants.2 He submitted the sample group’s claims to a jury for
individual determinations and then extrapolated outcomes for the nonsampled claims by applying the average sample group determinations to
each subclass, respectively.3 The Fifth Circuit ultimately rejected Judge
Parker’s sampling procedure on constitutional grounds.4
In recent years, courts and commentators have criticized the use of
sampling to prove classwide liability and damages. 5 It is widely
believed that sampling serves goals of efficiency, but only at the cost of
reliability—and that the “benefits of efficiency can never be purchased
at the cost of fairness.”6
In a 1992 Stanford Law Review article, Professors Michael Saks
and Peter Blanck argued that sampling, when performed correctly, not
only satisfies the standards of reliability achievable through individual
litigation, but that sampling can also increase the reliability of legal
outcomes.7
However, courts have generally been unwilling to accept the
reliability of sampling procedures used to prove classwide liability and
damages; and courts frequently reject sampling on constitutional and
procedural grounds.8 But, as Saks and Blanck have asserted, “a major—
perhaps the major—due process concern in an aggregated trial is the
validity of the outcome.”9 Moreover, “[t]he main argument against trial
by aggregation and sampling asserts that such trials cannot give the
parties as accurate a result as they would obtain through traditional
bilateral trials.”10
2 Id. at 652–54; see also Hillel J. Bavli, Aggregating for Accuracy: A Closer Look at
Sampling and Accuracy in Class Action Litigation, 14 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 67, 68 (2015)
[hereinafter Aggregating for Accuracy].
3 Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 2, at 68.
4 See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
5 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011).
6 Malcolm v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993); see also In re Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1023 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jones, J., concurring).
7 Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of
Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 815–19 (1992).
8 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2561; see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815, 845 (1999) (citing Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997)).
9 Saks & Blanck, supra note 7, at 833 (emphasis in original); see also Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Martin
H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural
Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 476–77 (1986).
10 Saks & Blanck, supra note 7, at 833; see also In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d at 1020
(“[O]ur procedural due process concerns focus on the fact that the procedure embodied in the
district court’s trial plan is devoid of safeguards designed to ensure that the claims against
Chevron of the non-represented plaintiffs as they relate to liability or causation are determined in
a proceeding that is reasonably calculated to reflect the results that would be obtained if those
claims were actually tried.”).
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The question remains: why have courts and commentators largely
discounted the argument that sampling offers not only increased
efficiency, but reliability as well? In a 2015 paper, I explain that a
primary source of skepticism may be the generality with which the
argument has been made.11 Although Saks and Blanck, and others, have
suggested that sampling may increase the reliability of legal outcomes,
the literature has not adequately developed the argument or produced a
framework to analyze the effect of sampling on reliability. 12 Indeed,
sampling does not inevitably increase the reliability of legal outcomes;
rather, its effect on reliability depends on the particular features of the
claims.13 Therefore, in Aggregating for Accuracy, I develop a formal
framework for examining conditions under which sampling can increase
the reliability of legal outcomes.14
In this Article, I explain my conclusions in Aggregating for
Accuracy in non-mathematical terms, and underscore certain
implications with respect to class action litigation and considerations in
light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tyson Foods, Inc.
v. Bouaphakeo.15 I begin by describing the building blocks of my
analysis—the concepts of reliability and accuracy in the law.
I. RELIABILITY IN THE LAW
Assume that for every legal claim there is a “correct” outcome that
can be determined by applying the “true” state of the law to the
complete facts surrounding the claim.16 But, in the real world, complete
knowledge regarding the law and the facts surrounding a claim is
unavailable. Consequently, a legal outcome (resulting from a trial or
other adversarial proceeding) serves as an estimate of the “correct”
outcome for the claim. Therefore, for every legal claim, there is an error
term that (although generally unknown) reflects the disparity between
the observed outcome and the “correct” outcome. Accuracy, then, is
defined in terms of the proximity of the observed outcome to the
“correct” outcome.17
11
12
13
14
15
16

Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 2, at 69.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
Alternatively, it can be assumed that there is a distribution of “correct” outcomes
associated with every legal claim. See generally Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 2, at 69.
17 See generally id. at 74; Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts:
Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 247 (1990) (discussing “accuracy”). Note that accuracy can be defined more
formally using the concepts of bias and variance. However, an explicit discussion of these
concepts is beyond the scope of this Article.
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One convenient and arguably sensible conceptualization of the
“correct” outcome associated with a legal claim is the award that would
result from computing the mean of infinitely many adjudications of the
claim under various conditions (e.g., various jury compositions, judges,
attorneys, presentations of evidence, etc.).18
Thus, I define the reliability of a legal procedure as the accuracy of
the legal outcome that can be expected by following the procedure. For
example, if it is expected that a certain legal procedure will produce a
highly accurate outcome—an observed outcome in close proximity to
the “correct” outcome—the procedure is considered reliable.19
An in-depth discussion of the role of accuracy in the law is beyond
the scope of this Article. I assume that accuracy is a fundamental goal
of the law, whether such goal is grounded in accuracy itself or a further
aim, such as deterrence or fairness.20
II. CLAIM AND JUDGMENT VARIABILITY
Critics of sampling have focused on the error that results from
applying a point estimate—e.g., the average of the sample group
outcomes—to a class of heterogeneous legal claims.21 Heterogeneity
can be described in terms of claim variability—i.e., the variability of the
facts of the claims, or, more precisely, the variability of the “correct”
outcomes associated with individual claims.22
But critics of sampling have ignored a second type of error: error
resulting from judgment variability.23 Judgment variability represents
the randomness associated with a claim’s outcome. It arises from the
variability in conditions under which outcomes are determined,
including the composition of the jury, the judge presiding over the case,
the presentation of evidence, the attorneys involved in the case, etc.24
For example, if a single claim is tried ten times independently (each trial
18 See Saks & Blanck, supra note 7, at 833–34; Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 2, at
74. Other measures of central tendency, such as the median, are also possible. For simplicity,
throughout this Article we use solely the mean.
19 See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 2, at 74–78 for a detailed discussion of accuracy
and variability in the law.
20 See id. at 75; Saks & Blanck, supra note 7, at 829 (citing Redish & Marshall, supra note 9,
at 476–77).
21 Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 2, at 75–76. See generally Saby Ghoshray, Hijacked
by Statistics, Rescued by Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Probing Commonality and Due Process Concerns
in Modern Class Action Litigation, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 467 (2012). If there are subclasses, then a
court is likely to assign the average sample group outcome within each subclass to the nonsampled claims in each subclass, respectively. See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F.
Supp. 649, 651–54 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
22 Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 2, at 76.
23 Id. at 76–78.
24 Id. at 76–77.
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with a new selection of trier of fact, attorneys, etc.), it is likely that there
would be ten distinct verdicts. But, if there is a single correct outcome
associated with the claim, then judgment variability reflects error—
disparities between the observed outcomes and the “correct” outcome.25
For simplicity, I assume that, on average, a case will result in the
“correct” outcome—in statistical terms, the outcome is unbiased.
Judgment variability represents the degree to which an observed
outcome varies around the “correct” outcome.26 The reader may
imagine a bell curve centered at the “correct” outcome, where the
judgment variability determines the width of the curve. On average, the
outcome will be the “correct” outcome; but the outcome is variable
around the “correct” outcome, and such randomness, represented by
judgment variability, reflects error.27
In determining appropriate standards in the class action context,
courts and commentators have focused on error resulting from claim
variability, but have generally ignored error resulting from judgment
variability.28 Indeed, even the purported ideal of individual litigation
produces outcomes that are subject to judgment variability.
III. REDUCING JUDGMENT VARIABILITY WITH SAMPLING
Consider a costly procedure through which the outcome of a claim
is determined by averaging the verdicts resulting from ten independent
“replications” of a trial, or “repeated adjudications” (involving, for
example, different judges, juries, attorneys, presentations of evidence,
etc.). Assuming the outcome is relatively unbiased, it is easy to show
that following this procedure results in an accurate outcome—an
outcome that is close to the “correct” outcome. Similarly, this procedure
will produce an accurate outcome for each claim of each member of a
putative class (or subclass). Replication thus increases the reliability of
legal outcomes by reducing the error caused by judgment variability.
On the other hand, the costs of such a procedure are enormous, and
likely not justified by the benefits of the procedure for a single claim (or
for each putative class member’s claim that requires application of the
procedure for the individual claim).
Importantly, however, in a class of homogeneous claims, it is not
necessary to follow the procedure for each class member’s claim to
25 See Saks & Blanck, supra note 7; Edward K. Cheng, When 10 Trials Are Better than 1000:
An Evidentiary Perspective on Trial Sampling, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 958–60 (2012);
Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 2, at 75–78.
26 See generally Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 2, at 75–78.
27 See id. at 75–79. Consider the magnitude of error that results from judgment variability
when classwide damages are determined by adjudicating a single representative claim.
28 Id. at 76–78.
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realize the benefits of the procedure: following the replication procedure
for a single claim and extrapolating the result to all claims of the
homogeneous class (or subclass) will yield the reliability benefits as
though the procedure was followed for each claim.
Class actions provide opportunities to realize the reliability
benefits of replication without incurring the prohibitive costs that such
procedures entail.29 In particular, courts can use sampling to improve
legal outcomes by reducing error resulting from judgment variability.
Moreover, sampling may offer a degree of reliability that cannot be
obtained even through the purported ideal of individual adjudication.
Further, although homogeneity is helpful, it is not necessary. As
explained below, the benefits of sampling in a heterogeneous class
depend on whether, and to what extent, the error resulting from
judgment variability dominates the error resulting from claim
variability.30
IV. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SAMPLING CAN IMPROVE THE
RELIABILITY OF LEGAL OUTCOMES
Above, I describe how repeated adjudication can increase the
reliability of legal outcomes. Assuming a certain degree of
homogeneity, if a court were unconstrained by cost or law in its pursuit
of reliability, it might “sample” all the claims of a class for individual
adjudication and then replace all individual outcomes with a single
aggregated outcome. In fact, a court could further reduce the error
resulting from judgment variability by adjudicating each claim twice, or
more times for that matter. But, in addition to the high costs of
litigation, a court’s ability to achieve extremely reliable outcomes is
constrained by law.
In Aggregating for Accuracy, I argue that a court may not replace
an individualized outcome with an aggregated one.31 I highlight a
fundamental distinction, based on constitutional law and rules of civil
procedure, between a court’s authority to extrapolate a representative
claim’s determination to unadjudicated claims and its authority to
replace an individually adjudicated outcome with an aggregated one.32
A detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
Assume, therefore, that a court must choose between sampling a claim
for individual adjudication and preserving the claim for assignment of

29
30
31
32

Id. at 77.
Id. at 78; see Saks & Blanck, supra note 7, at 833–37.
Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 2, at 78–80.
Id.
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an aggregated outcome extrapolated from the sampled claims.33
This constraint can be modeled using a type of explorationexploitation tradeoff I call reductive sampling, in which sampling a
unit—here, a legal claim—means reducing (or, as here, eliminating) its
eligibility for later extrapolation with respect to that unit.34
In Aggregating for Accuracy, I show that, using the reductive
sampling framework and standard statistical tools for minimizing error,
in the context of a class of homogeneous (or relatively homogeneous)
claims, accuracy is maximized, not by adjudicating each of the claims
individually (as is often viewed as ideal), but rather by determining
individual outcomes for a small random sample of claims, and assigning
the average of the sample group outcomes to the remaining, nonsampled, claims.35 In particular, I show that, for a class of N
homogeneous claims, a court maximizes accuracy by sampling
claims, rather than all N claims, for individual adjudication.36 For
example, if the class contains 5,000 homogeneous claims, a court can
maximize accuracy by randomly sampling about 70 claims for
individual adjudication, assigning the 70 individual outcomes to the
sampled claims, and assigning the arithmetic mean of the 70 sample
outcomes to the remaining 4,930 claims.
(or about 70 in the example above) is the number that balances,
on the one hand, a court’s interest in obtaining information regarding
the “correct” outcome of the homogeneous claims (which increases with
sample size), and, on the other hand, its interest in preserving claims to
which to assign the accurate aggregated outcome.37 The 70 claims in
the sample group receive individual adjudications that are subject to
significant error caused by judgment variability, whereas the remaining
4,930 claims in the extrapolation group are assigned aggregated
outcomes that have been “refined” by repeated adjudication—i.e.,
outcomes whose judgment variability has been reduced significantly by
averaging over approximately 70 repeated adjudications.38
Now, to examine sampling in the context of heterogeneous claims,
consider an additional factor: although the sampling procedure
described above reduces error caused by judgment variability, assigning
a single aggregated outcome (e.g., the average of the sample group
adjudications) as the estimate of the “correct” outcomes associated with
a group of heterogeneous claims—claims that actually involve
33
34

See id. at 80–81.
Id. See generally Herbert Robbins, Some Aspects of the Sequential Design of Experiments,
58 BULL. AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 527 (1952); J. C. Gittins, Bandit Processes and Dynamic
Allocation Indices, 41 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y: SERIES B (METHODOLOGICAL) 148 (1979).
35 See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 2, at 81–82.
36 Id.
37 See id. at 80–81.
38 Id. at 80–82.
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numerous distinct “correct” outcomes—introduces error reflecting the
disparities between the estimate and each of the “correct” outcomes. 39
Thus, as the heterogeneity of the class increases, the value of assigning
a single aggregated outcome as the estimate of the “correct” outcomes
decreases.40 Further, at some degree of heterogeneity, the benefits of
sampling, with respect to judgment variability, are outweighed by the
detriments of sampling, with respect to claim variability. 41
In Aggregating for Accuracy, I show that if claim variability is
zero, then the optimal sample size is
, the homogeneous optimum; if
claim variability is greater than judgment variability (e.g., in terms of
damages awarded), the optimal sample size is N, which is equivalent to
individual adjudications; and finally, if judgment variability is greater
than claim variability, then the optimal sample size is between
and
N, and can be determined by a particular formula (derived in
Aggregating for Accuracy) involving the number of claims in the class,
claim variability, and judgment variability.42
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions explained above, and derived in Aggregating for
Accuracy, have important implications for a court’s treatment of
statistical sampling in class action litigation. Perhaps most importantly,
a court should not assume, as many courts have, that sampling reduces
reliability. The discussion above makes clear that sampling may
enhance reliability as well as efficiency.
For example, these conclusions have important implications in the
context of class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, class representatives have
proposed sampling procedures for purposes of fulfilling the Rule’s
requirement that “the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”43
In addressing this requirement, the class representatives have offered
sampling-based methodologies at the class certification stage in attempt
to demonstrate that liability and damages can be determined on a
classwide basis.44 Courts regularly reject such attempts, however, on
grounds—implicitly or explicitly—of reliability. But, for the reasons
39
40
41
42
43

Id. at 82–83.
Id.
See id. at 82–83. See generally Saks & Blanck, supra note 7.
See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 2, at 83.
See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3)).
44 See Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1433–34; Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct.
1036, 1043–44 (2016).
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discussed above, courts are generally not justified in assuming that
sampling diminishes reliability.
The Supreme Court, in its recent decision in Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo, refused to adopt “a broad rule against the use in class
actions of . . . representative evidence”—specifically, evidence based on
“a representative or statistical sample” offered to establish classwide
liability.45 Instead, it held that “[w]hether and when statistical evidence
can be used to establish classwide liability will depend on the purpose
for which the evidence is being introduced and on ‘the elements of the
underlying cause of action.’”46
Tyson Foods involved claims by Tyson employees, certified by the
district court as a Rule 23(b)(3) class, alleging that their employer,
Tyson, failed to pay compensable overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) and Iowa law for time spent “donning and
doffing protective gear.”47 The district court submitted the issues of
liability and damages to the jury, which “returned a special verdict
finding that time spent in donning and doffing protective gear . . . was
compensable work,” and “awarded the class about $2.9 million in
unpaid wages.”48 Tyson appealed, arguing, inter alia:
[T]he class should not have been certified because the primary
method of proving injury assumed each employee spent the same
time donning and doffing protective gear, even though differences in
the composition of that gear may have meant that, in fact, employees
took different amounts of time to don and doff.49

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and the
award.50
In ruling that the district court did not err in certifying the class, the
Supreme Court held:
In many cases, a representative sample is “the only practicable
means to collect and present relevant data” establishing a defendant’s
liability. Manual of Complex Litigation §11.493, p. 102 (4th ed.
2004). In a case where representative evidence is relevant in proving
a plaintiff’s individual claim, that evidence cannot be deemed
improper merely because the claim is brought on behalf of a class.
To so hold would ignore the Rules Enabling Act’s pellucid
instruction that use of the class device cannot “abridge . . . any

45
46
47
48

Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1046.
Id. (quoting Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 809 (2011)).
Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1042.
Id. at 1044. Note that a class expert recommended an award of approximately $6.7 million.
Id. at 1052.
49 Id. at 1041.
50 Id. at 1044; Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2014).
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substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).51

The Court continued: “One way for respondents to show, then, that
the sample relied upon here is a permissible method of proving
classwide liability is by showing that each class member could have
relied on that sample to establish liability if he or she had brought an
individual action.”52 It held that “[i]f the sample could have sustained a
reasonable jury finding as to hours worked in each employee’s
individual action, that sample is a permissible means of establishing the
employees’ hours worked in a class action.”53
The Court clarified its ruling in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,54
explaining that “Wal-Mart does not stand for the broad proposition that
a representative sample is an impermissible means of establishing
classwide liability.”55 Wal-Mart involved a class of approximately 1.5
million current and former female employees alleging gender
discrimination under Title VII.56 The Court explained that “[t]he
plaintiffs in Wal-Mart did not provide significant proof of a common
policy of discrimination to which each employee was subject.”57
Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs’ proposed
methodology—proposed “as a means of overcoming th[e] absence of a
common policy”58—by which a sample of class members would be
selected for individual determinations of liability and backpay, and the
aggregated damages award would be derived by extrapolating the
“number of (presumptively) valid claims” from the percentage of the
sampled claims determined to be valid, and then multiplying this
number by “the average backpay award in the sample set.”59
The Court explained that its holding in Tyson Foods is “in accord
with” its decision in Wal-Mart: “Since the Court held that the
employees were not similarly situated, none of them could have
prevailed in an individual suit by relying on depositions detailing the
ways in which other employees were discriminated against by their
particular store managers.”60 The Court explained that “[b]y extension,
51
52
53

Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1046.
Id.
Id. at 1046–47. The Court explained:
If the employees had proceeded with 3,344 individual lawsuits, each employee likely
would have had to introduce [the class expert’s] study to prove the hours he or she
worked. Rather than absolving the employees from proving individual injury, the
representative evidence here was a permissible means of making that very showing.

Id. at 1047.
54 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
55 Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1048.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011)).
60 Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1048.
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if the employees had brought 1½ million individual suits, there would
be little or no role for representative evidence,” and that “[p]ermitting
the use of that sample in a class action, therefore, would have violated
the Rules Enabling Act by giving plaintiffs and defendants different
rights in a class proceeding than they could have asserted in an
individual action.”61 In Tyson Foods, the Court held:
[T]he study here could have been sufficient to sustain a jury finding
as to hours worked if it were introduced in each employee’s
individual action. While the experiences of the employees in WalMart bore little relationship to one another, in this case each
employee worked in the same facility, did similar work, and was
paid under the same policy.62

Thus, although the Supreme Court explicitly refused to adopt
“broad and categorical rules governing the use of representative and
statistical evidence in class actions,” the Tyson Foods decision approves
the use of representative evidence to establish classwide liability. 63
Distinguish two types of sampling methodologies that putative
class representatives have attempted to use for establishing classwide
liability and damages: 1) the use of “representative evidence” offered to
the trier of fact as probative of classwide liability64 or damages, and 2)
the use of representative adjudications to extrapolate outcomes for nonsampled (i.e., non-adjudicated) claims.65 Although the Supreme Court
did not distinguish between these two types of sampling methodologies,
it is likely that Tyson Foods expands the ability of class representatives
to use representative evidence to establish classwide liability in
particular.

61
62

Id.
Id. at 1048. The Supreme Court held that, although the “question whether uninjured class
members may recover is one of great importance,” it is not “a question yet fairly presented by this
case, because the damages award has not yet been disbursed, nor does the record indicate how it
will be disbursed.” Id. at 1050. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion. Id. Significantly, Chief Justice Roberts expressed concern, in a concurring
opinion joined in part by Justice Alito, that, since the district court may be unable to “fashion a
method for awarding damages only to those class members who suffered an actual injury,” id. at
1050, “it remains to be seen whether the jury verdict can stand.” Id. at 1053. Additionally, Justice
Thomas, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Alito, asserted that “[t]he District Court erred at
the class certification stage by holding that the plaintiffs satisfied Rule 23’s predominance
requirement.” Id. at 1054. According to the dissenting opinion, the issue of “whether each
employee worked over 40 hours without receiving full overtime pay” was “clearly
individualized,” and, with respect to the “critical issue” of whether the “individualized nature of
employees’ donning and doffing times defeated predominance,” id., the district court erred by
certifying the class without giving “proper consideration to the significance of variable donning
and doffing times.” Id. at 1055.
63 Id. at 1049.
64 See id. at 1043.
65 See Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 2, at 70–72 (citing cases and literature); see, e.g.,
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 652–54 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
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Regarding the use of representative evidence, the Court held:
A representative or statistical sample, like all evidence, is a means to
establish or defend against liability. Its permissibility turns not on the
form a proceeding takes—be it a class or individual action—but on
the degree to which the evidence is reliable in proving or disproving
the elements of the relevant cause of action.66

The Court’s decision in Tyson Foods approves the use of statistical
sampling to establish classwide liability; but the role of reliability in
determining whether a court permits statistical sampling to prove
classwide liability remains central to the analysis.
The conclusions explained above suggest that, while a court should
examine the reliability of statistical sampling for, among other things,
methodological flaws and issues related to the cohesiveness of the class,
it should not discount the reliability of statistical sampling—and
representative evidence in particular—because of the sampling itself.
Indeed, as explained above, sampling may improve reliability as well as
efficiency.
Additionally, it is important to realize that, although the discussion
above relates particularly to the reliability benefits of representative
adjudications, the conclusions generally apply to representative
evidence as well. As explained, repeated adjudication may improve
reliability by enabling a court, in essence, to incorporate additional
information regarding a class of claims—e.g., by averaging over
multiple adjudications rather than relying on a single adjudication—and
thus minimize error caused by judgment variability. Repeated
adjudication in a heterogeneous class similarly confers reliability
benefits, as long as the error-reducing benefits of “information sharing”
with respect to judgment variability outweigh the error-inducing costs
with respect to claim variability.
The use of representative evidence similarly improves reliability.
Although the method of “information sharing” using representative
evidence is different—involving, for example, the additional step of
providing the information to the trier of fact, rather than incorporating it
in the outcome directly (e.g., by averaging over repeated
adjudications)—insofar as the trier of fact incorporates the
representative evidence in its determination of the outcome, the
reliability benefits of repeated adjudication apply similarly to the use of
representative evidence.67
66 Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1046 (citing FED. R. EVID. 401, 403, 702) (emphasis
added).
67 In particular, in Aggregating for Accuracy, an award in a heterogeneous class is modeled
hierarchically: the “correct” awards in the class are distributed around some global mean, whereas
each actual award is “drawn” from a distribution around each claim’s “correct” award. See
generally Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 2, at 82–83. The former distribution represents
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Tyson Foods is likely to have a significant impact on class action
litigation. Putative class representatives will be encouraged to use
representative evidence to establish classwide liability, and perhaps
damages as well. Using arguments establishing, for example, that “each
class member could have relied on th[e] sample to establish liability if
he or she had brought an individual action,” putative class
representatives will improve their ability to establish predominance
under Rule 23(b)(3).68
In light of Tyson Foods, a court considering Rule 23(b)(3)
certification is likely to focus more heavily and more explicitly on the
reliability of representative evidence and statistical sampling generally.
Although a statistical sample should be carefully scrutinized to detect,
among other things, methodological deficiencies and issues regarding
the cohesiveness of the class, sampling often improves the reliability of
legal outcomes.

claim variability, whereas the latter distribution represents judgment variability. In a
homogeneous class, replication offers accuracy benefits by providing additional information
regarding the “correct” award associated with the replicated claim, which otherwise would be
obscured by judgment variability. In a heterogeneous class, sampling offers accuracy benefits,
with respect to a certain claim, not by providing information regarding that claim’s “correct”
award directly, but by providing information regarding the global mean around which all of the
“correct” awards are distributed, and thereby regarding the “correct” award for the subject claim
indirectly. Similarly, representative evidence, such as the type in dispute in Tyson Foods (where,
for example, the sample reflects variability of measured donning and doffing times rather than
judgment variability), offers accuracy benefits, with respect to a certain claim, by providing
information regarding the global mean around which the “correct” awards are distributed, and
thereby regarding the “correct” award for that claim in particular. Another way of understanding
this is through “comparable-case guidance” (CCG) methods, whereby a court uses information
regarding awards in prior comparable cases as guidance for a fact-finder’s determination of
damages. See Hillel J. Bavli, The Logic of Comparable-Case Guidance in the Determination of
Awards for Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages, U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
[hereinafter The Logic of CCG]. The Logic of CCG examines the statistical mechanism by which
CCG affects awards, and the conditions under which such evidence will improve accuracy. In
particular, the paper explains that, under certain mild behavioral assumptions, the risk that such
evidence would reduce accuracy—that error resulting from claim variability and bias would
outweigh the accuracy benefits of reducing judgment variability—is minimal. See id. Like CCG,
representative evidence provides information regarding the distribution of “correct” awards for
comparable claims, including the global mean, and, in turn, about the “correct” award for the
subject claim.
68 Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1046.

